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An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values
Abstract
This article presents an overview of the Schwartz theory of basic human values. It discusses
the nature of values and spells out the features that are common to all values and what
distinguishes one value from another. The theory identifies ten basic personal values that
are recognized across cultures and explains where they come from. At the heart of the
theory is the idea that values form a circular structure that reflects the motivations each value
expresses. This circular structure, that captures the conflicts and compatibility among the ten
values is apparently culturally universal. The article elucidates the psychological principles
that give rise to it. Next, it presents the two major methods developed to measure the basic
values, the Schwartz Value Survey and the Portrait Values Questionnaire. Findings from
82 countries, based on these and other methods, provide evidence for the validity of the
theory across cultures. The findings reveal substantial differences in the value priorities of
individuals. Surprisingly, however, the average value priorities of most societal groups exhibit
a similar hierarchical order whose existence the article explains. The last section of the article
clarifies how values differ from other concepts used to explain behavior—attitudes, beliefs,
norms, and traits.
This article is available in Online Readings in Psychology and Culture: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol2/iss1/11
Introduction 
Values have been a central concept in the social sciences since their inception. For both 
Durkheim (1897/1964) and Weber (1905/1958), values were crucial for explaining social 
and personal organization and change. Values have played an important role not only in 
sociology, but in psychology, anthropology, and related disciplines as well. Values are 
used to characterize cultural groups, societies, and individuals, to trace change over time, 
and to explain the motivational bases of attitudes and behavior. 
Application of the values construct in the social sciences during the past century 
suffered from the absence of an agreed-upon conception of basic values, of the content 
and structure of relations among these values, and of reliable empirical methods to 
measure them (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000). Recent theoretical and 
methodological developments (Schwartz, 1992; Smith & Schwartz, 1997) have brought 
about a resurgence of research on values.  
The recent theory concerns the basic values that people in all cultures recognize. It 
identifies ten motivationally distinct types of values and specifies the dynamic relations 
among them. Some values conflict with one another (e.g., benevolence and power) 
whereas others are compatible (e.g., conformity and security). The "structure" of values 
refers to these relations of conflict and congruence among values. Values are structured in 
similar ways across culturally diverse groups. This suggests that there is a universal 
organization of human motivations. Although the nature of values and their structure may 
be universal, individuals and groups differ substantially in the relative importance they 
attribute to the values. That is, individuals and groups have different value “priorities” or 
“hierarchies.”  
A Theory of Value Contents and Structure 
The Nature of Values 
When we think of our values, we think of what is important to us in life. Each of us holds 
numerous values (e.g., achievement, security, benevolence) with varying degrees of 
importance. A particular value may be very important to one person but unimportant to 
another. The value theory (Schwartz, 1992, 2006a) adopts a conception of values that 
specifies six main features that are implicit in the writings of many theorists:1 
(1) Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated, they 
become infused with feeling. People for whom independence is an important value 
become aroused if their independence is threatened, despair when they are helpless to 
protect it, and are happy when they can enjoy it.  
(2) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. People for whom social order, 
justice, and helpfulness are important values are motivated to pursue these goals.  
                                               
1
 e.g., Allport, 1961; Feather, 1995; Kluckhohn, 1951; Morris, 1956; Rokeach 1973. 
3
Schwartz: An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
 (3) Values transcend specific actions and situations. Obedience and honesty values, 
for example, may be relevant in the workplace or school, in business or politics, with 
friends or strangers. This feature distinguishes values from norms and attitudes that 
usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.  
(4) Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of 
actions, policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or 
illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, based on possible consequences for their 
cherished values. But the impact of values in everyday decisions is rarely conscious. 
Values enter awareness when the actions or judgments one is considering have 
conflicting implications for different values one cherishes. 
(5) Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. People’s values form an 
ordered system of priorities that characterize them as individuals. Do they attribute 
more importance to achievement or justice, to novelty or tradition? This hierarchical 
feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes. 
(6) The relative importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or behavior 
typically has implications for more than one value. For example, attending church 
might express and promote tradition and conformity values at the expense of hedonism 
and stimulation values. The tradeoff among relevant, competing values guides 
attitudes and behaviors (Schwartz, 1992, 1996). Values influence action when they are 
relevant in the context (hence likely to be activated) and important to the actor.  
 
The above are features of all values. What distinguishes one from another is the type of 
goal or motivation that it expresses. The values theory defines ten broad values according to 
the motivation that underlies each of them. These values are likely to be universal because 
they are grounded in one or more of three universal requirements of human existence with 
which they help to cope. These requirements are needs of individuals as biological 
organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of 
groups. Individuals cannot cope successfully with these requirements of human existence 
on their own. Rather, people must articulate appropriate goals to cope with them, 
communicate with others about them, and gain cooperation in their pursuit. Values are the 
socially desirable concepts used to represent these goals mentally and the vocabulary 
used to express them in social interaction.  
I next define each of the ten values in terms of the broad goal it expresses, note its 
grounding in universal requirements, and refer to related value concepts. To make the 
meaning of each value more concrete and explicit, I list in parentheses the set of value 
items included in the first survey instrument to measure each value. Some important value 
items (e.g., self-respect) have multiple meanings; they express the motivational goals of 
more than one value. These items are listed in brackets.  
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 Self-Direction 
Defining goal: independent thought and action--choosing, creating, exploring.  
Self-direction derives from organismic needs for control and mastery (e.g., Bandura, 1977; 
Deci, 1975) and interactional requirements of autonomy and independence (e.g., 
Kluckhohn, 1951; Kohn & Schooler, 1983). (creativity, freedom, choosing own goals, 
curious, independent) [self-respect, intelligent, privacy]  
Stimulation 
Defining goal: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.  
Stimulation values derive from the organismic need for variety and stimulation in order to 
maintain an optimal, positive, rather than threatening, level of activation (e.g., Berlyne, 
1960). This need probably relates to the needs underlying self-direction values (cf. Deci, 
1975). (a varied life, an exciting life, daring)  
Hedonism 
Defining goal: pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself.  
Hedonism values derive from organismic needs and the pleasure associated with 
satisfying them. Theorists from many disciplines (e.g., Freud, 1933; Williams, 1968) 
mention hedonism. (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent)2  
Achievement 
Defining goal: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social 
standards.  
Competent performance that generates resources is necessary for individuals to survive 
and for groups and institutions to reach their objectives. As defined here, achievement 
values emphasize demonstrating competence in terms of prevailing cultural standards, 
thereby obtaining social approval. (ambitious, successful, capable, influential) [intelligent, 
self-respect, social recognition]3 
Power 
Defining goal: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.  
The functioning of social institutions apparently requires some degree of status 
differentiation (Parsons, 1951). A dominance/submission dimension emerges in most 
empirical analyses of interpersonal relations both within and across cultures (Lonner, 
1980). To justify this fact of social life and to motivate group members to accept it, groups 
                                               
2
  Although happiness is an important value, it is not included because people achieve it through 
attaining whatever outcomes they value (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). 
3
  Achievement values differ from McClelland's (1961) achievement motivation. Achievement 
motivation concerns meeting internal standards of excellence. It is expressed in self-direction 
values.  
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 must treat power as a value. Power values may also be transformations of individual 
needs for dominance and control. Value analysts have mentioned power values as well 
(e.g., Allport, 1961). (authority, wealth, social power) [preserving my public image, social 
recognition]  
Both power and achievement values focus on social esteem. However, achievement 
values (e.g., ambitious) emphasize the active demonstration of successful performance in 
concrete interaction, whereas power values (e.g., authority, wealth) emphasize the 
attainment or preservation of a dominant position within the more general social system.   
Security 
Defining goal: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. 
Security values derive from basic individual and group requirements (cf. Kluckhohn, 1951; 
Maslow, 1965). Some security values serve primarily individual interests (e.g., clean), 
others wider group interests (e.g., national security). Even the latter, however, express, to 
a significant degree, the goal of security for self or those with whom one identifies. (social 
order, family security, national security, clean, reciprocation of favors) [healthy, moderate, 
sense of belonging]  
Conformity 
Defining goal: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others 
and violate social expectations or norms. 
Conformity values derive from the requirement that individuals inhibit inclinations that 
might disrupt and undermine smooth interaction and group functioning. As I define them, 
conformity values emphasize self-restraint in everyday interaction, usually with close 
others. (obedient, self-discipline, politeness, honoring parents and elders) [loyal, 
responsible]  
Tradition 
Defining goal: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's 
culture or religion provides. 
Groups everywhere develop practices, symbols, ideas, and beliefs that represent their 
shared experience and fate. These become sanctioned as valued group customs and 
traditions. They symbolize the group's solidarity, express its unique worth, and contribute 
to its survival (Durkheim, 1912/1954; Parsons, 1951). They often take the form of religious 
rites, beliefs, and norms of behavior. (respect for tradition, humble, devout, accepting my 
portion in life) [moderate, spiritual life] 
Tradition and conformity values are especially close motivationally; they share the 
goal of subordinating the self to socially imposed expectations. They differ primarily in the 
objects to which one subordinates the self. Conformity entails subordination to persons 
with whom one frequently interacts—parents, teachers, and bosses. Tradition entails 
subordination to more abstract objects—religious and cultural customs and ideas. As a 
6
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 corollary, conformity values exhort responsiveness to current, possibly changing 
expectations. Tradition values demand responsiveness to immutable expectations from 
the past.  
Benevolence 
Defining goal: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact (the ‘in-group’). 
Benevolence values derive from the basic requirement for smooth group functioning (cf. 
Kluckhohn, 1951) and from the organismic need for affiliation (cf. Maslow, 1965). Most 
critical are relations within the family and other primary groups. Benevolence values 
emphasize voluntary concern for others’ welfare. (helpful, honest, forgiving, responsible, 
loyal, true friendship, mature love) [sense of belonging, meaning in life, a spiritual life].  
Benevolence and conformity values both promote cooperative and supportive social 
relations. However, benevolence values provide an internalized motivational base for such 
behavior. In contrast, conformity values promote cooperation in order to avoid negative 
outcomes for self. Both values may motivate the same helpful act, separately or together. 
Universalism 
Defining goal: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all 
people and for nature. 
This contrasts with the in-group focus of benevolence values. Universalism values derive 
from survival needs of individuals and groups. But people do not recognize these needs 
until they encounter others beyond the extended primary group and until they become 
aware of the scarcity of natural resources. People may then realize that failure to accept 
others who are different and treat them justly will lead to life-threatening strife. They may 
also realize that failure to protect the natural environment will lead to the destruction of the 
resources on which life depends. Universalism combines two subtypes of concern—for the 
welfare of those in the larger society and world and for nature (broadminded, social justice, 
equality, world at peace, world of beauty, unity with nature, wisdom, protecting the 
environment)[inner harmony, a spiritual life]  
An early version of the value theory (Schwartz, 1992) raised the possibility that 
spirituality might constitute another near-universal value. The defining goal of spiritual 
values is meaning, coherence, and inner harmony through transcending everyday reality. 
If finding ultimate meaning is a basic human need, then spirituality might be a distinct 
value found in all societies. The value survey therefore included possible markers for 
spirituality, gleaned from widely varied sources (a spiritual life, meaning in life, inner 
harmony, detachment, unity with nature, accepting my portion in life, devout). However, 
spirituality did not demonstrate a consistent meaning across cultures. In the absence of a 
consistent cross-cultural meaning, spirituality was dropped from the theory despite its 
potential importance in many societies. 
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 The Structure of Value Relations  
In addition to identifying ten basic values, the theory explicates the structure of dynamic 
relations among them. One basis of the value structure is the fact that actions in pursuit of 
any value have consequences that conflict with some values but are congruent with 
others. For example, pursuing achievement values typically conflicts with pursuing 
benevolence values. Seeking success for self tends to obstruct actions aimed at 
enhancing the welfare of others who need one's help. But pursuing both achievement and 
power values is usually compatible. Seeking personal success for oneself tends to 
strengthen and to be strengthened by actions aimed at enhancing one's own social 
position and authority over others. Another example: Pursuing novelty and change 
(stimulation values) is likely to undermine preserving time-honored customs (tradition 
values). In contrast, pursuing tradition values is congruent with pursuing conformity values. 
Both motivate actions of submission to external expectations.  
Actions in pursuit of values have practical, psychological, and social consequences. 
Practically, choosing an action alternative that promotes one value (e.g., taking drugs in a 
cultic rite—stimulation) may literally contravene or violate a competing value (obeying the 
precepts of one’s religion—tradition). The person choosing what to do may also sense that 
such alternative actions are psychologically dissonant. And others may impose social 
sanctions by pointing to practical and logical inconsistencies between an action and other 
values the person professes. Of course, people can and do pursue competing values, but 
not in a single act. Rather, they do so through different acts, at different times, and in 
different settings. 
The circular structure in Figure 1 portrays the total pattern of relations of conflict and 
congruity among values. Tradition and conformity are located in a single wedge because, 
as noted above, they share the same broad motivational goal. Conformity is more toward 
the center and tradition toward the periphery. This signifies that tradition values conflict 
more strongly with the opposing values. The expectations linked to tradition values are 
more abstract and absolute than the interaction-based expectations of conformity values. 
They therefore demand a stronger, unequivocal rejection of opposing values.  
Viewing values as organized along two bipolar dimensions lets us summarize the 
oppositions between competing values. As Figure 1 shows, one dimension contrasts 
‘openness to change’ and ‘conservation’ values. This dimension captures the conflict 
between values that emphasize independence of thought, action, and feelings and 
readiness for change (self-direction, stimulation) and values that emphasize order, self-
restriction, preservation of the past, and resistance to change (security, conformity, 
tradition). The second dimension contrasts ‘self-enhancement’ and ‘self-transcendence’ 
values. This dimension captures the conflict between values that emphasize concern for 
the welfare and interests of others (universalism, benevolence) and values that emphasize 
pursuit of one's own interests and relative success and dominance over others (power, 
achievement). Hedonism shares elements of both openness to change and self-
enhancement. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model of relations among ten motivational types of value 
 
 
Although the theory discriminates ten values, it postulates that, at a more basic level, 
values form a continuum of related motivations. This continuum gives rise to the circular 
structure. To clarify the nature of the continuum, I note the shared motivational emphases 
of adjacent values:  
 
a) power and achievement--social superiority and esteem;  
b) achievement and hedonism--self-centered satisfaction;  
c) hedonism and stimulation--a desire for affectively pleasant arousal;  
d) stimulation and self-direction--intrinsic interest in novelty and mastery;  
e) self-direction and universalism--reliance upon one's own judgment and comfort with 
the diversity of existence;  
f) universalism and benevolence--enhancement of others and transcendence of 
selfish interests;  
g) benevolence and tradition--devotion to one's in-group;  
h) benevolence and conformity--normative behavior that promotes close relationships;  
i) conformity and tradition--subordination of self in favor of socially imposed 
expectations;  
Universalism
Benevolence
Conformity
Tradition
Security
Self-Direction
Stimulation
Hedonism
Achievement
Power
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 j) tradition and security--preserving existing social arrangements that give certainty to 
life;  
k) conformity and security--protection of order and harmony in relations;  
l) security and power--avoiding or overcoming threats by controlling relationships and 
resources.   
 
In sum, the circular arrangement of the values represents a motivational continuum. The 
closer any two values in either direction around the circle, the more similar their underlying 
motivations; the more distant, the more antagonistic their motivations. The idea that values 
form a motivational continuum has a critical implication: Dividing the domain of value items 
into ten distinct values is an arbitrary convenience. It is reasonable to partition the value 
items into more or less fine-tuned distinct values according to the needs and objectives of 
one’s analysis.4 Conceiving values as organized in a circular motivational structure has an 
important implication for the relations of values to other variables. It implies that the whole 
set of ten values relates to any other variable (behavior, attitude, age, etc.) in an integrated 
manner.  
Measuring Value Priorities 
The Schwartz Value Survey 
The first instrument developed to measure values based on the theory is now known as 
the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992, 2006a). The SVS presents two lists of 
value items. The first contains 30 items that describe potentially desirable end-states in 
noun form; the second contains 26 or 27 items that describe potentially desirable ways of 
acting in adjective form.5 Each item expresses an aspect of the motivational goal of one 
value. An explanatory phrase in parentheses following the item further specifies its 
meaning. For example, ‘EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)’ is a universalism item; 
‘PLEASURE (gratification of desires)’ is a hedonism item.  
Respondents rate the importance of each value item "as a guiding principle in MY 
life" on a 9-point scale labeled 7 (of supreme importance), 6 (very important), 5, 4 
(unlabeled), 3 (important), 2, 1 (unlabeled), 0 (not important), -1 (opposed to my values). 6 
People view most values as varying from mildly to very important. This nonsymmetrical 
scale is stretched at the upper end and condensed at the bottom in order to map the way 
people think about values, as revealed in pre-tests. The scale also enables respondents to 
                                               
4
  A recent refinement of the theory, partitions the same continuum into 19 more narrowly defined 
values that permit more precise explanation and prediction (Schwartz, et al., 2012). 
5
  This followed Rokeach’s (1973) idea that ends values and means values function differently. My 
research suggests that this distinction has no substantive importance (Schwartz, 1992). One 
item in the 56-item SVS (1988) was dropped and two others added in the revised 57-item 
version (1994). 
6
  Schwartz (1994) explains the rational for preferring rating of value importance to ranking.  
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 report opposition to values that they try to avoid expressing or promoting. This is especially 
necessary for cross-cultural studies.  
The score for the importance of each value is the average rating given to items 
designated a priori as markers of that value. The number of items to measure each value 
ranges from three (hedonism) to eight (universalism), reflecting the conceptual breadth of 
the values. Only value items that have demonstrated near-equivalence of meaning across 
cultures in analyses using multi-dimensional scaling (SSA; Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2006a) 
and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004) are included in the 
indexes.  
The Portrait Values Questionnaire 
The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) is an alternative to the SVS developed in order to 
measure the ten basic values in samples of children from age 11-14 and of persons not 
educated in Western schools that emphasize abstract, context-free thinking. It works 
equally well with adults in representative national samples. The PVQ also permitted 
assessing whether the values theory is valid independent of measurement method.7  
The PVQ includes short verbal portraits of 40 different people, gender-matched with 
the respondent (Schwartz, 2006a; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, & Harris, 2001). 
Each portrait describes a person’s goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the 
importance of a value. For example: “Thinking up new ideas and being creative is 
important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way” describes a person for 
whom self-direction values are important. “It is important to him to be rich. He wants to 
have a lot of money and expensive things” describes a person who cherishes power 
values.  
For each portrait, respondents answer: “How much like you is this person? 
Responses range from ‘very much like me’ to ‘not like me at all’. We infer respondents’ 
own values from their self-reported similarity to people described implicitly in terms of 
particular values. Respondents are asked to compare the portrait to themselves rather 
than themselves to the portrait. Comparing other to self directs attention only to aspects of 
the other that are portrayed. So, the similarity judgment is also likely to focus on these 
value-relevant aspects.  
The verbal portraits describe each person in terms of what is important to him or her. 
Thus, they capture the person’s values without explicitly identifying values as the topic of 
investigation. The PVQ asks about similarity to someone with particular goals and 
aspirations (values) rather than similarity to someone with particular traits. The same term 
can refer to both a value and a trait (e.g., ambition, wisdom, obedience). However, people 
who value a goal do not necessarily exhibit the corresponding trait; nor do those who 
exhibit a trait necessarily value the corresponding goal. For example, people may value 
                                               
7
  Both Brocke and Bilsky (2005, July) and Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, and Suh (1998) have 
subsequently developed paired comparison instruments based on the SVS to measure the ten 
basic values.  
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 creativity as a guiding principle in life but not be creative. And some creative people may 
attribute little importance to creativity as a value that guides them.  
The number of portraits for each value ranges from three (stimulation, hedonism, 
and power) to six (universalism), reflecting the conceptual breadth of the values. The score 
for the importance of each value is the average rating given to these items. All the value 
items have demonstrated near-equivalence of meaning across cultures in analyses using 
multi-dimensional scaling (Schwartz, 2006a). A shorter, 21-item version of the PVQ has 
been developed for use with representative national samples in large surveys when time is 
limited. Although reliability of measurement is compromised by the reduction in items, this 
instrument also demonstrates reasonable meaning equivalence across cultures and 
considerable predictive validity (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; Schwartz, 2006b). 
Generating Value Priorities 
Respondents differ in the way they use response scales. Some rate most abstract values 
very important as guiding principles (SVS) or most portraits very similar to themselves 
(PVQ). Others use the middle of the response scales, and still others rate most values 
unimportant or most portraits dissimilar to themselves. The scale should measure people’s 
value priorities, the relative importance of the different values. This is because what affects 
behavior and attitudes is the tradeoff among relevant values, not the importance of any 
one value. Say, two people rate tradition values 4. Despite this same rating, tradition 
obviously has higher priority for a person who rates all other values lower than for one who 
rates all other values higher. To measure value priorities accurately, we must eliminate 
individual differences in use of the response scales. We do this by subtracting each 
person’s mean response to all the value items from his or her response to each item. This 
converts the ratings into relative importance scores for each of the person’s values—into 
value priorities.  
Cross-Cultural Evidence for the Theory  
Studies have assessed the theory with data from hundreds of samples in 82 countries 
around the world, using either the SVS or PVQ methods of measurement. The samples 
include highly diverse geographic, cultural, linguistic, religious, age, gender, and 
occupational groups, with representative national samples from 37 countries (Bilsky, Janik 
& Schwartz, 2011; Davidov et al., 2008; Schwartz, 2006b). In these analyses, the 
oppositions of self-transcendence to self-enhancement values and of openness to change 
to conservation values are virtually universally present. Moreover, each of the ten basic 
values is distinguished in at least 90% of samples. When a value is not distinguished, the 
items that measure it are mixed together with the items of a value that is adjacent to it in 
the value circle of Figure 1. These findings show that people in most cultures respond to 
ten types of values as distinct and that the broader value orientations captured by adjacent 
values are discriminated nearly universally. They strongly support the idea that human 
values form the motivational continuum postulated by the theory. 
12
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 Roots of the Dynamic Structure of Value Relations 
It is quite amazing that the structure of relations among values is common to all human 
societies we have studied. Why is this so? Thus far, we have suggested one dynamic 
principle that organizes the structure of values: congruence and conflict among the values 
that are implicated simultaneously in decisions. Figure 2 suggests additional principles.8  
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic underpinnings of the universal value structure 
 
A second principle is the interests that value attainment serves. Values in the top 
panel of Figure 2 (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction) primarily 
regulate how one expresses personal interests and characteristics. Values in the bottom 
panel (benevolence, universalism, tradition, conformity, security) primarily regulate how 
                                               
8
  The value theory specifies the order of the 10 values. Figures 1 and 2  both show this  order, but 
each orients the circle differently. Rotation of the value circle does not affect the meaning of the 
structure. 
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 one relates socially to others and affects their interests. Figure 2 shows that security and 
universalism values are boundary values. They primarily concern others’ interests, but 
their goals also regulate pursuit of own interests.  
Relations of values to anxiety are a third organizing principle. Pursuit of values on the left 
in Figure 2 serves to cope with anxiety due to uncertainty in the social and physical world. 
These are self-protective values. People seek to avoid conflict (conformity) and to maintain 
the current order (tradition, security) or actively to control threat (power). Values on the 
right (hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence) express anxiety-
free motivations. These are growth or self-expansive values. Achievement values do both: 
Meeting social standards successfully may control anxiety and it may affirm one’s sense of 
competence. Drawing on the grounding of values in interests and in anxiety can help in 
predicting and understanding relations of values to various attitudes and behavior. 
A Pan-Cultural Baseline of Value Priorities9 
Individuals differ substantially in the importance they attribute to the ten values. Across 
societies, however, there is surprising consensus regarding the hierarchical order of the 
values. Across representative samples, using different instruments, the importance ranks 
for the ten values are quite similar. Benevolence, universalism, and self-direction values 
are most important. Power and stimulation values are least important. The pan-cultural 
hierarchy provides a baseline to which to compare the priorities in any sample. Such 
comparison is critical for identifying which, if any, of the value priorities in a sample are 
distinctively high or low. A sample may rank benevolence highest, for example, but 
compared with other samples the importance rating of this value may still be relatively low.  
Why is there such a pan-cultural hierarchy of values? It probably derives from the 
adaptive functions of values in maintaining societies and from our common human nature 
(e.g., Campbell, 1975; Parsons, 1951; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). Socializers and social 
control agents discourage values that clash with the smooth functioning of significant 
groups or the larger society. Values that clash with human nature are unlikely to be 
important. The basic social function of values is to motivate and control the behavior of 
group members (Parsons, 1951). Two mechanisms are critical. First, values serve as 
internalized guides for individuals; they relieve the group of the necessity for constant 
social control. Second, people invoke values to define particular behaviors as socially 
appropriate, to justify their demands on others, and to elicit desired behaviors. Socializers 
seek, consciously or not, to instill values that promote group survival and prosperity. To 
explain the pan-cultural value hierarchy, we must explain why particular values are viewed 
as more or less desirable across societies.10 
                                               
9
  Schwartz and Bardi (2001) provide a detailed examination of this topic on which this section 
draws. 
10
  This does not mean that the pan-cultural value hierarchy reflects individual tendencies to 
respond in a socially desirable manner to value surveys. The personality variable of social 
desirability does not correlate consistently with the importance individuals attribute to the values 
that are high in the pan-cultural hierarchy (Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky, & Sagiv, 1997). 
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 Three demands of human nature and requirements of societal functioning are 
especially relevant: (1) Most important is to promote and preserve cooperative and 
supportive relations among primary group members. The critical focus of value 
transmission is to develop commitment to positive relations, identification with the group, 
and loyalty to its members. (2) Individuals must be motivated to invest time and effort to 
perform productive work, to solve problems that arise when working, and to generate new 
ideas and technical solutions. (3) It is socially functional to legitimize gratification of self-
oriented needs and desires as long as this does not undermine group goals. Rejecting all 
such gratification would frustrate individuals and lead them to withhold their energies from 
the group and its tasks.  
The high importance of benevolence values (ranked 1st) derives from the centrality of 
positive, cooperative social relations in the family, the main setting for initial and continuing 
value acquisition. Benevolence values provide the internalized motivational base for such 
relations. They are reinforced and modeled early and repeatedly. Universalism values (2nd) 
also contribute to positive social relations. They are functionally important primarily when 
group members must relate to those with whom they do not readily identify, in schools, 
work-places, etc. They may even threaten in-group solidarity during times of intergroup 
conflict. Therefore, universalism values are less important than benevolence values. 
Security (4th) and conformity (5th) values also promote harmonious social relations. 
They do this by helping to avoid conflict and violations of group norms. But these values 
are usually acquired in response to demands and sanctions to avoid risks, control 
forbidden impulses, and restrict the self. This reduces their importance because it conflicts 
with gratifying self-oriented needs and desires. Moreover, the emphasis of these values on 
maintaining the status quo conflicts with innovation in finding solutions to group tasks. 
Acting on tradition values (overall 8th) can also contribute to group solidarity and thus to 
smooth group functioning and survival. But tradition values find little expression in the 
behavior that interaction partners have a vital interest in controlling. They largely concern 
commitment to abstract beliefs and symbols. 
Pursuing power values (10th) may harm or exploit others and damage social 
relations. Still, they have some importance because power values help to motivate 
individuals to work for group interests. They also justify the hierarchical social 
arrangements in all societies. 
Self-direction (3rd) values serve the second and third basic functions of values 
without undermining the first. They foster creativity, motivate innovation, and promote 
coping with challenges. Behavior based on these values is intrinsically motivated. It 
satisfies individual needs without harming others. Hence, it rarely threatens positive social 
relations. Interestingly, self-direction values are much less important and conformity values 
much more important in countries where the typical nuclear family is large (seven or more 
children). To maintain order, very large families need to enforce conforming behavior 
rather than cultivating each member’s unique interests and abilities.  
The moderate importance of achievement values (7th) may reflect a compromise 
among the bases of value importance. On the positive side, these values motivate 
individuals to invest in group tasks and legitimize self-enhancing behavior as long as it 
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 contributes to group welfare. On the negative side, these values foster efforts to attain 
social approval that may disrupt harmonious social relations and interfere with group goal 
attainment.  
The importance of hedonism (6th) and stimulation (9th) values derives from the 
requirement to legitimize inborn needs to attain pleasure and arousal. These values are 
probably more important than power values because, unlike power values, their pursuit 
does not necessarily threaten positive social relations.  
How Values Relate to Attitudes, Beliefs, Traits and Norms 
When trying to explain why individuals’ behave as they do, people often refer to attitudes, 
beliefs, traits, or norms. A crucial way in which each of these concepts differs from values 
is that it varies on another scale, so it is measured differently. As described above, values 
vary on importance as guiding principles in life. 
Attitudes are evaluations of objects as good or bad, desirable or undesirable. 
Attitudes can evaluate people, behaviors, events, or any object, whether specific (ice 
cream) or abstract (progress). They vary on a positive/negative scale. Values underlie our 
attitudes; they are the basis for our evaluations. We evaluate people, behaviors, events, 
etc. positively if they promote or protect attainment of the goals we value. We evaluate 
them negatively if they hinder or threaten attainment of these valued goals. If we value 
stimulation highly and attribute little importance to security values, for example, we are 
likely to have a positive attitude toward bungee jumping.  
Beliefs are ideas about how true it is that things are related in particular ways. 
Examples of beliefs are “war never solves problems,” “Africa is larger than Europe,” and 
“psychologists are wise.” Beliefs vary in how certain we are that they are true. General 
beliefs that people hold about how the world functions are called social axioms (Leung & 
Bond, 2004). Unlike values, beliefs refer to the subjective probability that a relationship it 
true, not to the importance of goals as a guiding principles in life. 
Norms are standards or rules that tell members of a group or society how they 
should behave. Examples of norms are “children should be seen and not heard,” “we 
should stand up when the national anthem is played.” Norms vary on a scale of how much 
we agree or disagree that people should act in a specific way. Our values affect whether 
we accept or reject particular norms. Because norms prescribe behaviors with specific 
consequences, we are more or less inclined to accept them depending on whether these 
consequences are compatible or in conflict with our valued goals. More generally, because 
norms are social expectations, we are more or less inclined to accept them depending on 
how important conformity vs. self-direction values are to us.  
Traits are tendencies to show consistent patterns of thought, feelings, and actions 
across time and situations. As noted above, the same term can refer to both a value and a 
trait (e.g., wisdom, obedience). However, people who exhibit a trait may not value the 
corresponding goal and those lacking a trait may value the corresponding goal highly. For 
example, a person may behave obediently yet not value obedience and behave foolishly 
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 yet value wisdom highly. Traits vary in the frequency and intensity with which people 
exhibit them. They describe what people are like rather than what people consider 
important. People believe their values are desirable but may consider their traits positive or 
negative.  
Conclusions 
The individual level values theory has identified ten basic, motivationally distinct values 
that people in virtually all cultures implicitly recognize. The validity of this claim does not 
depend on the way we measure values. The ten basic values emerge whether people 
report their values explicitly (SVS) or whether we infer their values indirectly from their 
judgments of how much various other people are like them (PVQ). The values theory 
applies in populations around the world. Especially striking is the emergence of the same 
circular structure of relations among values across countries and measurement 
instruments. People everywhere experience conflict between pursuing openness to 
change values or conservation values. They also experience conflict between pursuing 
self-transcendence or self-enhancement values. Conflicts between specific values (e.g., 
power vs. universalism, tradition vs. hedonism) are also near-universal. I described several 
dynamic processes that may account for the observed circular structure. These processes 
may point the way toward a unifying theory of human motivation. 
An astonishing finding of the cross-cultural research is the high level of consensus 
regarding the relative importance of the ten values across societies. In the vast majority of 
nations studied, benevolence, universalism, and self-direction values appear at the top of 
the hierarchy and power, tradition, and stimulation values appear at the bottom. This 
implies that the aspects of human nature and of social functioning that shape individual 
value priorities are widely shared across cultures. I presented the initial, functionalist 
explanation that has been offered for this phenomenon. It deserves much more analysis in 
depth.  
Values are one important, especially central component of our self and personality, 
distinct from attitudes, beliefs, norms, and traits. Values are critical motivators of behaviors 
and attitudes. In another article, I will examine how we come to hold the values we do and, 
most importantly, how our value priorities influence our behavior and attitudes. 
 
Relevant Links 
http://www.humanvalues.eu/ 
https://elias.it.helsinki.fi/PSYKO/values.nsf 
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Discussion Questions 
(1) Are there any values important to you that are not part of the basic ten? Try to place 
them in one of the ten by considering the motivation they express. 
(2) Hedonism is becoming more important in most Western societies. How is this likely to 
affect the importance of the other values around the circle? Which values are likely to 
become more important along with hedonism and which ones less important? 
(3) Considering how much cultures differ, how can it be that people in almost all societies 
organize their values into the same circular structure? 
(4) How are war, economic depression, or personal crises, likely to affect our value 
priorities?  Why? 
(5) When people talk about values, they usually mean ‘moral’ values. Which values are 
‘moral’ and which are not? What makes a value ‘moral’? 
(6) People often behave in ways that seem to contradict their values. How can the value 
circle help to explain this? 
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